For the first time, this book classifies how attention shifts, and argues that self-awareness, reflection, and even morality, are best thought of as dynamic...

Originally published in 1936, this book presents the ancient Greek text of the paraphrases and quotations of Zeno's philosophical arguments, together with a facing-page English translation and editorial commentary. Detailed notes are incorporated throughout and a bibliography is also included. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Zeno and ancient philosophy.

As the United States is currently prosecuting two wars, it is important to consider whether those wars, and the resulting noncombatantcasualties, can be morally justified. Such consideration can be initiated by considering some of Alan Donagan’s work in his book The Theory of Morality. In that book Donagan sets out to develop, as a philosophical system, that part of the common morality according to the Hebrew-Christian tradition, which does not depend on any theistic beliefs. According to that tradition it is (...) sometimes morally permissible to resort to war. This poses a problem because also part of the tradition is a near absolute prohibition on harming innocent people. Since innocent people die in war, there is a tension here.Donagan claims that this problem can be solved by assigning the blame for some such deaths to the aggressor, thereby permitting (some) resorts to war. This paper shows that this solution is inadequate; and defends a more plausible (and more traditional) justification for some innocent deaths. This justification is consistent with the system Donagan develops, and thus may have application in the consideration of the justification of the two wars currently being prosecuted by the United States. (shrink)

We formalize what it means to have permission to say something. We adapt the dynamic logic of permission by van der Meyden (J Log Comput 6(3):465–479, 1996 ) to the case where atomic actions are public truthful announcements. We also add a notion of obligation. Our logic is an extension of the logic of public announcements introduced by Plaza ( 1989 ) with dynamic modal operators for permission and for obligation. We axiomatize the logic and show that it is decidable.

Aron Gurwitsch claims that the field of consciousness is invariantly organized in a theme, thematic field, margin pattern. However, at least two perceptual presentations, chaos and boundlessness, are not ordered in accordance with this pattern. The question this study poses then is the following: given Gurwitsch's field-theory of experiential organization, what is the structure, status, and function of chaos and boundlessness in the field of consciousness? ;Using Gurwitsch's field-theory organization as a base, the structure of thematic chaos and then of (...) thematic boundlessness is articulated: the first by contrasting the field-theories of Gurwitsch and James, the second by contrasting Gurwitsch and Kant. It is concluded that in both cases no thematic Gestalt-coherence and no thematic field as relevant context is presented. ;In terms of status and function, chaos and boundlessness are interpreted as necessary limits. These "limit cases" are not "ideal limits" since they are possible perceptual presentations. Also, limit is taken to mean a two-edged presentation, one that is both an ending and a beginning. Interpreting Gurwitsch, we conclude that both cases are epistemological endings, since they represent a necessary end to the ordinary perception of things. Interpreting James, we conclude that it is possible that thematic chaos is also a metaphysical beginning in experience, since it is that experience in which reality is presented as underived and original. Interpreting Kant, we conclude that it is possible that boundlessness is also an ethical beginning in experience, since it is that experience in which the most original feeling of our sense of humanity is presented. ;We show that chaos and boundlessness each have their own unique field-organization, that they function as two-edged limits involving epistemological concerns on the one hand and metaphysical and ethical concerns respectively on the other, and that their structure and status as limits in the field of consciousness are not contingent but necessary. (shrink)

The aim of this work was to compare experimental investigations on effects of lidocaine, calcium and, BRL 34915 on reentries to simulated data obtained by use of a model of propagation based on the Huygens' constriction method already described in previous works. Calcium and lidocaine effects are investigated on anisotropic conduction conditions. In both cases, reduction in conduction velocities are observed. In lidocaine case, a refractory area is located along the longitudinal axis. In agreement with experimental electrical mapping, the simulations (...) show that the stabilization of reentrant excitation is mainly due to the existence of this refractory area around which the reentrant circuit can develop. The experimental study shows that BRL 34915 has both arrhythmogenic and antiarrhythmic effects. A detailed electrophysiological analysis has shown that drug infusion act on normal cardiac cells by decreasing the relative and absolute refractory period. BRL 34915 action is simulated by a decrease in the refractory period showing that the time frequency of the reentrant activity is increased and that the spatial size where the reentry is developing is becoming smaller. These two effects are arrhythmogenic, the simulated data being so in good agreement with the experimental ones. (shrink)

Evolutionary fitness threats and rewards are associated with subjectively unpleasant and pleasant sensations, respectively. Initially, these correlations appear explainable via adaptation by natural selection. But here I analyse the major metaphysical perspectives on consciousness – physicalism, dualism, and panpsychism – and conclude that none help to understand the adaptive-seeming correlations via adaptation. I also argue that a recently proposed explanation, the phenomenal powers view, has major problems that mean it cannot explain the adaptive-seeming correlations via adaptation either. So the mystery (...) – call it the evolutionary paradox of consciousness – remains. Some have used this mystery to argue for non-naturalistic (e.g. theistic) explanations. But I propose a naturalistic, non-adaptive explanation of the adaptive-seeming correlations: namely, ‘sensational associative learning’ during development. In this perspective, pairing of particular sensations with unconditioned stimuli – fitness rewards or threats – cause the sensations themselves to come to be interpreted as good or bad, respectively. Sensations, like colours, that are not reliably paired with either fitness rewards or threats remain largely unvalenced. Sensational associative learning also provides explanations for adaptive-seeming structural aspects of sensations, such as the observation that sounds of different pitch are experienced as ordinal in correspondence to their wavelengths while the same is not true of colours of different hue. The sensational associative learning perspective appears compatible with physicalism, panpsychism, and dualism (though not epiphenomenalism). (shrink)

Ideal interpretation is understanding a text in the best possible way. It is usually used when the text has a canonical status, such as the Bible or the U.S. Constitution. We argue that Zhu Xi’s view about interpreting the Four Books and Ronald Dworkin’s view about constitutional interpretation are examples of ideal interpretation and that their basic principles are similar. Each holds, roughly, that their target text contains moral truth; that the author’s mind requires the mediation of learning; that the (...) purpose of interpretation is not only to lead the reader to the moral truth but to become a better person; that all propositions are about the same moral truth or about political justice; that the interpretation ultimately must come from oneself, purged of prejudices; and that the only correct interpretation is one that captures the original meaning. (shrink)

This paper shows that Thomas Aquinas has a compatibilist position on the freedom of the will, where compatibilism is understood as the doctrine that determinism does not preclude freedom. Thomas’s position concerning free will is compatibilist regarding both the divine and human wills. Thomas pioneers the idea that human freedom is an image of divine freedom. It is on account of the notion that god is the exemplar toward which human beings proceed that it is much easier to understand why, (...) if the freedom of god’s will is compatible with the determinism of omnibenevolence, it is acceptable that the freedom of the human will is compatible with the determinism that ensues from what Thomas calls the “natural necessity” of the human will. The evidence for his compatibilist stance on divine freedom emerges from Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) I.74–91, whereas the strongest evidence for Thomas’s compatibilist position about human freedom derives from the Summa Theologiae (ST) and Quaestiones Disputatae De Malo (QDM) 6. This paper establishes a compatibilist reading of Thomas’s account of the freedom of the divine will and shows that Thomas’s theory of human freedom is modeled upon his treatment of divine freedom. Finally, I argue that the position maintained in QDM 6 does not abandon the theory presented in ST but instead is a clarification of it. Thus, Thomas presents a theory of freedom that is uniformly compatibilist. (shrink)

It would be difficult to name a more interesting scientific problem than that of knowledge of the brain, its overall mechanisms and its molecular nature. Rational management of the brain in the future and utilization of the principles of its functioning to construct various mechanisms to undergird present-day technological progress should follow as direct consequences of development of that sphere of knowledge.